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A B S T R A C T
Background and objectives: To assess the relationship between false memories and schizotypal experiences in
healthy volunteers. Previous research has examined a number of schizotypal dimensions and experiences and
found a variety of results. Our aim was to determine the speciﬁcity of these associations by giving participants a
schizotypy measure which tapped positive, negative and disorganised dimensions (O-LIFE) and another which
focused on delusional ideation (PDI).
Methods: A new memory task was used consisting of images of everyday items, separated into categories. At test
participants were presented with pictures which had been seen in the study phase, related lures (additional items
from the same categories but which were new) and new items which were not from these categories.
Results: Positive correlations were found between scores on the positive dimension of schizotypy/delusional
ideation and proportion of false memories. Moreover, these participants also had a greater tendency to respond
with the highest conﬁdence old response, regardless of the status of the item. No signiﬁcant correlations were
found with the other dimensions of schizotypy.
Limitations: The conﬁdence ﬁnding diﬀers somewhat from previous research, which has found more conﬁdence
in memory errors and less conﬁdence in correct responses in schizophrenia. It is unclear the reason(s) for this
discrepancy.
Conclusions: Increased false memory is associated with the positive dimension of schizotypy and delusional
ideation and not the disorganised or negative dimensions. Furthermore, our results suggest that those high in
positive schizotypy/delusional ideation require less evidence before they are willing to call an item old.
1. Introduction
Many people think of memory as being like a collection of video
clips that can be replayed when we need them, giving a ﬁxed and robust
narrative of the past. However, strong evidence exists to suggest that
memory is not a reproductive system but is a constructive process,
which involves piecing together elements of the experience that can be
aﬀected by expectations, beliefs and knowledge (Bartlett, 1932;
Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Thus memory can be fallible;
prone to distortion and error. A substantial literature demonstrates that
individuals with schizophrenia have marked diﬃculties with re-
membering events from their personal past (Aleman, Hijman, de Haan,
& Kahn, 1999; Danion, Rizzo, & Bruant, 1999; Gold, Randolph,
Carpenter, Goldberg, & Weinberger, 1992). It is important to under-
stand these memory deﬁcits, as they are one of the strongest predictors
of functional outcome (Green, 1996; Milev, Ho, Arndt & Anderson,
2005).
False memory describes memory for events that did not happen, and
it has received relatively less attention compared to veridical memory.
The classic way of examining false memory in the lab has been to use a
specialised paradigm called the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM;
Deese, 1959; revived by Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Here partici-
pants are presented with lists of words (e.g. tired, dream, bed, rest,
awake, snooze, blanket etc.) all related to a non-studied critical lure
(e.g. sleep). In a subsequent memory test, healthy volunteers frequently
recall or recognise the critical lure, which was not presented, usually
with high conﬁdence (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; see also Gallo,
2010 for further discussion of the DRM paradigm). A number of studies
have used this paradigm in people with schizophrenia, but results have
been mixed. Some studies ﬁnd no evidence for increased false memories
in this group (e.g. Elvevåg, Fisher, Weickert, Weinberger, & Goldberg,
2004; Huron & Danion, 2002; Lee, Iao, & Lin, 2007, Exp 1; Moritz,
Woodward, Cuttler, Whitman, & Watson, 2004; Paz-Alonso et al.,
2013), whereas other studies have (e.g. Bhatt, Laws, & McKenna, 2010;
Lee et al., 2007, Exp 2).
An alternative research strategy is to adopt a dimensional approach
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to schizophrenia and measure schizotypy (Claridge, 1997; Johns & van
Os, 2001). According to this view the symptoms of schizophrenia exist
as a continuum of experiences in the general population, albeit perhaps
fewer in quantity and/or in an attenuated form. When researchers have
examined the link between schizotypy and false memory, as assessed by
the DRM paradigm, a range of results have been found. Saunders,
Randell, and Reed (2012) found that those participants high in the
unusual experiences dimension of schizotypy (which maps on to posi-
tive experiences, such as hallucinations and delusions) and cognitive
disorganisation had more false memories to the non-studied critical
lure. However when Hodgetts, Hausmann, and Weis (2015) focused on
the cognitive disorganisation dimension they failed to replicate this
result with the critical lure, but did ﬁnd increased recognition of new
related items in participants high in this dimension (but only in those
low in estradiol). In contrast, Dagnall and Parker (2009) failed to ﬁnd
any diﬀerence in false memories between high and low scorers on in-
terpersonal and disorganised dimensions of schizotypy. They did,
however, ﬁnd that those participants who scored highly on a cognitive-
perceptual dimension of schizotypy had lower false memory than the
higher scorers.
Other researchers have focused on a speciﬁc symptom, in particular
delusions. A continuum approach can also be adopted to these, just like
schizotypy, in that many individuals within the general population may
also experience anomalous beliefs and it is argued delusions reﬂect the
extreme end of this scale (Peter, Joseph & Garety, 1999). Support for
this suggestion comes from a study that compared deluded inpatients to
participants from the general population. As would be anticipated the
deluded patients scored signiﬁcantly higher, but there was around 10%
of the general population who scored above the mean of the deluded
group on a measure of delusional ideation (PDI; Peters et al., 1999).
Two studies have found that healthy volunteers who score highly on the
Peters Delusional Inventory (PDI) have increased false memories on the
DRM paradigm (Dehon, Bastin, & Larøi, 2008; Laws & Bhatt, 2005; but
see also Corlett et al., 2009, who failed to ﬁnd this relationship). A later
study by Bhatt et al. (2010) found that individuals with schizophrenia
who were experiencing delusions recalled more false memories than
those with schizophrenia who were not delusional. Thus, there seems to
be greater consistency in ﬁnding increased false memory rate when the
more speciﬁc symptom of delusions or experience of delusional ideation
is examined.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that examining conﬁdence in the
memory decision can complement the work completed with memory
accuracy. Moritz and Woodward (2006) have suggested that over-
conﬁdence may play a role in the development and maintenance of
some of the symptoms of schizophrenia, particularly delusions. They
argue that false memory, where events are fabricated or distorted, may
be important in accounting for some delusional themes that may de-
velop. However they note that even if an individual has a large number
of false memories these may not aﬀect behaviour if the conﬁdence in
them is low i.e. they are tagged as fallible. The crucial factor is the
person's overconﬁdence in these beliefs. Balzan (2016) gives the ex-
ample of a person travelling on a bus who sees another passenger
looking angrily at them. Even if this appraisal is incorrect it is unlikely
to result in a strong cognitive or behavioural outcome. However if the
individual assigns a high degree of conﬁdence to this false perception it
may elicit a strong conviction in a false belief (e.g. “I am under sur-
veillance and my life is in danger”), which could lead to behavioural
consequences and emotional distress. Thus overconﬁdence in false
memories may also play a role in the genesis of delusions.
Not all researchers have examined the conﬁdence of the memory
judgement as well as memory accuracy in relation to delusions, but
there are a few examples. Corlett et al. (2009) failed to ﬁnd any re-
lationships between DRM false memories and schizotypy scores or de-
lusional ideation. However when they examined conﬁdence they found
that those participants with higher scores on the positive aspect of
schizotypy were more conﬁdent in their false memories. Laws and Bhatt
(2005) did ﬁnd a diﬀerence in the number of false memories between
those with high and low scores on delusional ideation and also reported
that those high in this dimension had greater conﬁdence in their false
memories. Similarly, Bhatt et al. (2010) also found eﬀects of conﬁdence
in their study of patients with and without delusions. Interestingly, they
found no diﬀerence between the two patient groups and controls on
proportion of high conﬁdence responses to false memories, but a higher
number of high conﬁdence new responses to old items i.e. misses, in the
patients with delusions.
The aim of this study was to assess the relationship between accu-
racy and conﬁdence of memories and schizotypal experiences in
healthy volunteers. As outlined above a few studies have looked at this
but a variety of results have been found. In light of this we wanted to
determine the speciﬁcity of the relationships between false memories
and dimensions of schizotypy and the more speciﬁc experience of de-
lusional ideation. Only one other study, to our knowledge, has done this
(Corlett et al., 2009) and they failed to ﬁnd any relationships between
any schizotypal experiences and false memory and did not report if
there was an association between conﬁdence in the false memory and
delusional ideation. In this study participants will be given the O-LIFE
(Mason, Claridge, & Jackson, 1995), a well-recognised measure of
schizotypy, which has four dimensions: Unusual Experiences (positive
schizotypal experiences), Cognitive Disorganisation (cognitive diﬃ-
culties and social anxiety), Introvertive Anhedonia (negative schizo-
typal experiences) and Impulsive Nonconformity (reckless and anti-
social tendencies; many researchers e.g. Pickering, 2004, have
questioned the inclusion of this dimension as it does not resemble any
feature of schizophrenia so it will not be considered in this study) and
the PDI (Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004). On the basis of work by
Laws and colleagues (Bhatt et al., 2010; Laws & Bhatt, 2005) we an-
ticipated ﬁnding a positive correlation between scores on the PDI and
proportion of false memories. Furthermore, the same direction of as-
sociation would be hypothesised between delusional ideation scores
and conﬁdence in memory errors. Given that the Unusual Experiences
dimension indexes positive schizotypal experiences, including halluci-
nations and delusions, and there is a high degree of correlation between
this dimension and the PDI (r= 0.65; Peters et al., 2004) we antici-
pated that the relationships stipulated with the PDI would also be found
for the Unusual Experiences dimension of the O-LIFE. Given that there
has been no consistent evidence of a relationship between disorganised
or negative schizotypal experiences no statistically signiﬁcant re-
lationships were predicted between the Cognitive Disorganised or In-
trovertive Anhedonia dimensions and false memories.
Finally, it is noteworthy that within this research area there is a
heavy reliance on the word DRM paradigm for eliciting false memories;
all of the studies mentioned this far use this paradigm. One exception to
this is Moritz, Woodward and Rodriguez-Raecke's (2006) study, which
employed a visual variant of the paradigm. Here, participants viewed
pictures of scenes e.g. a beach, with various prototypical items within
them e.g. a sandcastle; at test critical lures were prototypical items not
presented e.g. towel. Individuals with schizophrenia did not exhibit
more false memories but were more conﬁdent in their errors. Critically,
it is unknown whether the failure to ﬁnd diﬀerences in the number of
false memories is a result of the stimuli and paradigm used or because
the group was not split according to whether they experienced delu-
sions or not. Thus the ﬁnal aim of this study was to use a new pictorial
paradigm for examining the relationship between false memory and
schizotypal experiences. The task developed was based upon Dennis,
Bowman, and Vandekar (2012). In the study phase participants see a
number of pictures from several categories e.g. chairs A, B and C. At test
they see the same pictures again (chairs A, B and C), as well as addi-
tional pictures from the categories presented (related lures, chairs D, E
and F) and new items which are not from these categories (unrelated
lures, teddy bear). This is important to determine if the results found
thus far are generalizable and not paradigm speciﬁc.




Ninety-ﬁve undergraduate psychology students (83 females and 12
males) aged between 18 and 22 years old (M=19.2 years, SD=0.91
years) were tested. From a previous study which examined the corre-
lation between number of false memories and PDI score a correlation of
0.48 was found (Bhatt et al., 2010). Using this eﬀect size with an alpha
level of 0.05 with 0.80 power a minimum sample of 29 participants is
required. Participants received course credits for taking part in the
study. The data from nine participants were excluded because these
individuals had a corrected recognition score (proportion of hits – false
alarms to new items) below 0.2. The ﬁnal sample was of 86 participants
(74 females). All participants provided informed consent and the study
was approved by the departmental ethics committee.
2.2. Materials/apparatus
2.2.1. Questionnaires
The PDI (Peters et al., 2004) measures delusional ideation in the
healthy population. It consists of 21 items that describe a range of
unusual thoughts, such as: “Do you ever feel as if people are reading
your mind?” Participants are asked to answer yes/no (yes= 1; no=0).
If they answer yes there are three sub-items related to distress, pre-
occupation and conviction which are each measured on a 5 point Likert
scale (1–5, with 5 indicating a high level of distress, preoccupation or
conviction). Together these scales capture the multidimensionality of
delusions and total grand scores can range from 0 to 336. The PDI has
high internal consistency and test-retest reliability, as well as good
validity (see Peters et al., 2004 for more details). For this study the
scores that we obtained were as follows: yes/no (M=4.66, 0–18),
distress (M=12.63, 0–48), preoccupation (M=11.03, 0–41), convic-
tion (M=13.31, 0–48) and grand total (M=41.64, 0–140). The cor-
relation between these diﬀerent subscales is extremely high ranging
from 0.94 to 0.98 in this study and so we only use the grand total
measure in the Results section.
The Oxford Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-
LIFE; Mason et al., 1995) was used to assess schizotypy more globally to
examine the speciﬁcity of the relationship with false memory. The di-
mensions relevant to schizotypy are: Unusual Experiences (perceptual
aberrations, hallucinatory and delusional experiences and is akin to the
positive symptoms of psychosis); Cognitive Disorganisation (social an-
xiety as well as diﬃculties with concentration and decision-making)
and Introvertive Anhedonia (the inability to experience pleasure from
typically enjoyable activities). The mean schizotypy scores, together
with the range, obtained in our sample were as follows: Unusual Ex-
periences (M=5.99, 0–22), Cognitive Disorganisation (M=12.31,
1–24) and Introvertive Anhedonia (M=5.69, 0–16). The degree of
correlation between the O-LIFE dimensions and the PDI grand total
score in this study were as follows: Unusual Experiences [ρ(84)= 0.73,
p < 0.001], Cognitive Disorganisation [ρ(84)= 0.31, p < 0.01], and
Introvertive Anhedonia [ρ(84)= 0.13, p > 0.05].
2.2.2. False memory task
A computer-based false memory task was designed based upon the
work by Dennis et al. (2012). Stimuli consisted of 600 colour images of
everyday items, obtained from Google images and cropped and resized
to approximately 225× 225 pixels. Five-hundred images were of items
from speciﬁc categories, with 10 examples of each category type. These
categories includes items such as: cars, butterﬂies, skirts, fruit, trees and
mirrors. In addition, there were 100 images that were of unrelated
objects. During the study phase 250 images (5 from each category) were
presented in a randomised order. In the test phase, these images were
also presented (old items), together with the other 250 category items
(related lures) and the 100 unrelated images (unrelated lures) in a
random order. The old items and the related lures were counter-
balanced across participants.
2.3. Procedure
The initial study phase was incidental. Participants saw the images
in the centre of the screen, one at a time, and were asked to judge
whether they thought they would be able to lift the object or not and
indicate this with a keypress. Each study phase image was presented for
500ms and then participants were given 2000ms to make a response
before a blank screen was displayed for 250ms before the next trial.
After the study phase participants were given 20mins to complete the
O-LIFE and the PDI. In the test phase participants saw all images, one at
a time, and were required to make a 6 point old/new decision with
conﬁdence (1= sure new, 2= probably new, 3= perhaps new,
4=perhaps old, 5= probably old, 6= sure old). Each image was
displayed until participants had made a response and then there was a
blank screen for 250ms before the next image. After every 100 trials
there was an opportunity for participants to take a short break if they
wanted.
3. Results
The proportion of responses that participants gave to each stimulus
type is displayed in Table 1. The mean proportion of hits (an old re-
sponse to an old item) was 0.57 (SD=0.15), the proportion of false
memories to the related lure was 0.34 (SD=0.15) and false memories
to the unrelated lure was 0.07 (SD=0.09). As can be seen there was a
greater proportion of old responses (collapsing conﬁdence) to old items
than to related lures [t(85)= 18.76, p < 0.001] or unrelated lures [t
(85)= 34.74, p < 0.001], indicating participants' general ability to
discriminate old from new items. Moreover, participants' overall false
memory rate to unrelated lures was signiﬁcantly less than to related
lures [t(85)= 23.68, p < 0.001].
Spearman's correlations were calculated in the analyses outlined
below due to some violations in the assumptions underlying parametric
correlations for some variables. Levene's test for equality of variance
was used when comparing two independent samples. If this assumption
was found to be violated the degrees of freedom were reduced ac-
cordingly in that test.
3.1. PDI
Initially it was examined whether there was a relationship between
the number of false memories and PDI scores. A positive relationship
was found between this measure and false memories to the related lure
[ρ(84)= 0.22, p < 0.05] and also to the unrelated lure [ρ(84)= 0.25,
p < 0.05]. As some studies have used a diﬀerent analysis approach
Table 1
Mean proportion of responses given to each category of items (and standard deviation in parenthesis).
Sure new Probably new Perhaps new Perhaps old Probably old Sure old
Old 0.14 (0.18) 0.14 (0.09) 0.16 (0.12) 0.17 (0.11) 0.22 (0.13) 0.18 (0.12)
Related lure 0.22 (0.22) 0.22 (0.12) 0.22 (0.16) 0.14 (0.09) 0.13 (0.12) 0.07 (0.09)
Unrelated lure 0.48 (0.28) 0.30 (0.18) 0.14 (0.15) 0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.07) 0.01 (0.02)
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when assessing the link between PDI scores and false memory e.g.
splitting the sample and comparing the groups, a median split was also
performed (median=31; although see McClelland, Lynch, Irwin,
Spiller, & Fitzsimons, 2015, for issues with using a splitting approach).
A signiﬁcant diﬀerence was found between high and low scorers on the
PDI on false memories to the related lure [0.38 versus 0.30; t
(67.35)= 2.66, p= 0.01] and unrelated lure [0.10 versus 0.05; t
(53.42)= 2.96, p=0.005], with high scorers having more false
memories.
Next it was examined if there was a relationship between PDI scores
and conﬁdence. For these analyses we examined the proportion of most
conﬁdent responses (1= sure new or 6= sure old) to each of the item
types. Initially conﬁdence in memory errors was examined. There was
no signiﬁcant relationship between misses, where the participant is sure
that an old item is new, and PDI score [ρ(84)= 0.06, p > 0.10]. In
contrast, when looking at false alarm errors (false memory) there was a
signiﬁcant correlation between PDI scores and proportion of sure old
responses to: related lure items [ρ(84)= 0.27, p < 0.05] and unrelated
lures [ρ(84)= 0.29, p < 0.01].
We also examined participants' veridical memory. There was no
signiﬁcant correlation between PDI scores and hits i.e. saying old to an
old item [ρ(84)= 0.13, p > 0.10]. There was no relationships with
conﬁdence in new responses to related lures [ρ(84)= 0.01, p > 0.10]
or unrelated lures [ρ(84)=−0.01, p > 0.10]. There was a signiﬁcant
correlation between the proportion of sure old responses participants
gave to old items and PDI scores [ρ(84)= 0.23, p < 0.05].
3.2. O-LIFE dimensions
A parallel set of analyses, as were conducted with the PDI scores,
were also run with the O-LIFE dimensions of Unusual Experiences,
Cognitive Disorganisation and Introvertive Anhedonia, these results can
be seen in Table 2.
Signiﬁcant correlations were found between the Unusual
Experiences dimension of schizotypy and measures of conﬁdence,
which mirrored the pattern found with the PDI. There were signiﬁcant
associations between this dimension and proportion of sure old re-
sponses to: related lure items [ρ(84)= 0.26, p < 0.05], unrelated lures
[ρ(84)= 0.25, p < 0.05] and old items [ρ(84)= 0.26, p < 0.05]. No
signiﬁcant correlations were found between Unusual Experiences and
sure new responses to any item type (largest correlation= 0.15,
smallest p value=0.18). Finally, there were no signiﬁcant correlations
between the Cognitive Disorganisation or Introvertive Anhedonia di-
mensions of schizotypy and any conﬁdence measures (largest correla-
tion=0.1, smallest p value=0.35).
4. Discussion
The aim of the present study was to determine the speciﬁcity of the
relationship between certain schizotypal experiences and false mem-
ories. Corroborating previous research (Bhatt et al., 2010; Dehon et al.,
2008; Laws & Bhatt, 2005) a positive correlation was found between
delusional ideation and false memory, such that those individuals high
in delusional ideation had more false memories to both related and
unrelated lures. In addition, there was a positive association between
delusional ideation scores and proportion of the most conﬁdent old
rating to all three classes of item: old, related lures and unrelated lures.
There were no signiﬁcant relationships between PDI scores and the
most conﬁdent new rating to any of the item types. Taken together the
conﬁdence results indicate that as delusional ideation scores increase so
does the bias for giving highly conﬁdent old responses, but importantly
this is regardless of the status of the item. These patterns of results were
mirrored with the Unusual Experiences dimension of schizotypy, but
there were no signiﬁcant relationships between any of the variables
highlighted above and Cognitive Disorganisation or Introvertive An-
hedonia. Interestingly, there were no signiﬁcant relationship between
correct recognition of old items and any schizotypy dimension or ex-
perience. Thus the relationships between positive schizotypal experi-
ences and PDI scores only extends to false memory and not veridical
memory.
A secondary aim of this study was to determine if relationships
between schizotypal experiences and false memory would be found if a
new pictorial paradigm was used based upon Dennis et al. (2012). This
diﬀered somewhat from the traditional DRM paradigm because no
critical item was omitted at study, instead participants had to diﬀer-
entiate between pictures from a category that they had seen in an in-
cidental study phase and those they had not. The reason for examining
this is because Moritz, Woodward, and Rodriguez-Raecke (2006) failed
to ﬁnd diﬀerences in number of false memories between schizophrenia
patients and controls when using pictorial stimuli in a DRM paradigm.
Also the wider memory literature would suggest that it is easier to
discriminate old from new pictures compared to words (the picture
superiority eﬀect; Shepard, 1967), so less false alarms might be an-
ticipated to pictures compared to words, and there have been some
reports that the DRM eﬀect is reduced if study items are presented vi-
sually rather than auditorily (e.g. Smith & Hunt, 1998, although see
Smith, Hunt, & Gallagher, 2008 for how test format and order can aﬀect
this). The current study was successful in eliciting false memories, with
around a third of responses to the related lure being that the items were
old. In addition, the hypothesised relationships between false memory
and the positive/delusional dimension of schizotypy were found. Thus
the visual paradigm used by Moritz et al. (2006) does not appear to be
the reason for their failure to ﬁnd increased false memories in patients,
instead it is likely to be related to the symptomatology of the patients.
Our work suggests that the critical dimension of schizotypy when
examining false memory is the positive one and the experience of de-
lusional ideation. This oﬀers a useful way of thinking about and re-
conciling previous work in this area. Much of this work has tested in-
dividuals with schizophrenia and has not looked at symptom groups i.e.
positive and negative or speciﬁc symptoms. For example, in Lee et al.
(2007), Experiment 1, there was a failure to ﬁnd more false memories
to related words from the DRM paradigm between patients and con-
trols. They also state “Patients in the present experiment were stable
chronic patients; their positive symptoms were not as obvious as those
presented in the acute stage but they exhibited chronic negative
symptoms” (pg. 562). Thus in this particular study the patients tested
did not have many positive/delusional symptoms and it seems possible
that this might have led to the failure to ﬁnd diﬀerences in false
memory. In other studies it is diﬃcult to determine if the characteristics
of the patients may have had an eﬀect as they are not described in
suﬃcient detail to retrospectively assess this. For example, in the
Moritz et al. (2006) paper outlined above, the patients were not split
into delusional versus non-delusional groups. However the researchers
did conduct an analysis to examine if there was any relationship be-
tween false memory variables and speciﬁc symptoms e.g. delusions,
suspiciousness and hallucinations. No signiﬁcant relationships were
found but it is diﬃcult to determine if this was due to low levels of these
types of symptoms in this particular sample. An interesting question
which arises from this discussion is about the nature of the relationship
between delusions and false memory. If it is delusions in particular
which are related to increased levels of false memory then it would be
Table 2






Unusual Experiences .18a .23* .14
Cognitive Disorganisation .03 .07 .05
Introvertive Anhedonia .17 .16 .01
a = p < 0.1, * = p < 0.05.
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anticipated that this link would be observed not just in the context of
schizophrenia but also other disorders where delusions can be a
symptom, such as: some forms of dementia, somatic illnesses and brain
tumours/injury. This is a question which remains to be addressed.
Now that the link between positive/delusional symptoms and false
memory has been established the next step in subsequent work is to
understand the processes that lead to false memory and how these
might be abnormal in these individuals. This was not addressed ex-
perimentally in this study but some possibilities are highlighted. A
number of diﬀerent theories have been proposed as to the processes
that result in false memory e.g. activation-monitoring theory (Roediger
& McDermott, 2000; Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001),
fuzzy-trace theory (Brainerd, Reyna, & Kneer, 1995) and global
matching models (Hintzman, 1988; Shiﬀrin & Steyvers, 1997). Ac-
cording to the activation-monitoring account (Gallo, 2010; Roediger &
McDermott, 2000) the production of false memories is due to a com-
bination of spreading activation and processes that determine the origin
of information. When participants encounter an item during encoding
this activation spreads to related representations and so the presented
item, the related items and the encoding context become integrated in
the memory trace. In the subsequent test phase false memories are
produced because participants are unable to distinguish between items
actually presented to them and those that have become activated via
indirect association. Thus the spread in activation and/or the failure to
attribute the memory to the correct source leads to increased false
memories.
There is a large body of work which has examined spreading acti-
vation in schizophrenia using semantic priming tasks. The classic
ﬁnding is that participants are quicker to respond when the prime and
probe are related (e.g. cat-dog) compared to control conditions (e.g.
car-dog). This priming eﬀect is enhanced in individuals with schizo-
phrenia, which suggests that they have an even quicker spread of ac-
tivation compared to healthy volunteers. Moreover, when indirect
priming is examined (e.g. using a prime, day, which is related to the
probe, black, via a non-presented word, night) the priming eﬀects are
even greater which suggests that patients might have more widespread
activation than controls (e.g. Spitzer, 1997; Moritz, Woodward,
Kuppers, Lausen, & Schickel, 2003 and parallel ﬁndings in psychosis-
prone individuals: Johnston, Rossell, & Gleeson, 2008). These results
are generally found in patients with positive formal thought disorder
e.g. loosening of associations and tangentially of speech. These reﬂect
issues with the form of thinking; whereas delusions, which is the
symptoms usually found in relation to elevated false memories, reﬂect a
disorder in the content of thought. It is useful to note that in the current
study a positive relationship was found between positive/delusional
experiences and false memories to the unrelated lures. The spreading
activation account can be used to explain false memory to the related
lure but it is diﬃcult to see how it would explain this relationship given
the pictures are unrelated. This would suggest that another process
must to operating as well as or instead of spreading activation. Thus in
future research it would be informative to determine the link between
spreading activation and false memories and to tease apart the path-
ways and relationships they have with delusions and thought disorder.
There is also a sizeable research ﬁeld that has examined source
monitoring in schizophrenia and found that they have substantial
memory problems in determining the origin of information (e.g. Libby,
Yonelinas, Ranganath, & Ragland, 2013). Moreover, researchers have
also examined the type of decision which is important in a false
memory paradigm: between whether an item has been presented or
internally generated, known as reality monitoring (Johnson et al.,
1993). This type of memory judgement is proposed to play a role in the
pathogenesis of some of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, such
as hallucinations and delusions (Bentall, Baker, & Havers, 1991; Frith,
1992). A number of studies have found this deﬁcit in people with
schizophrenia (e.g. Brébion, Amador, Smith, Malaspina, Sharif, &
Gorman, 2000; Brébion, Gorman, Amador, Malaspina, & Sharif, 2002;
Keefe, Arnold, Bayen, McEvoy, & Wilson, 2002; Vinogradov et al.,
1997) and those scoring highly on schizotypy measures (e.g. Humpston,
Linden, & Evans, 2017) and also that it tends to be associated with the
positive symptoms of psychosis. Dehon et al. (2008) used a modiﬁed
DRM task which involved an additional phase where participants were
asked whether at study or test another word came to mind but they did
not write it down because the experimenter had not produced it. This
allowed them to get an index of activation and monitoring. Participants
high in delusional ideation demonstrated more unsuccessful mon-
itoring, but there was no relationship with activation. Thus further
studies of this sort are required which can tease apart the processes
contributing to false memory judgements and examine the relationships
with positive symptoms and experiences.
In the current study participants high in positive experiences/de-
lusional ideation showed a bias for giving highly conﬁdent responses
across all item types. This only partially replicates previous research in
this area. What has generally been found is that people with schizo-
phrenia exhibit more conﬁdence in their memory errors and also si-
multaneously can have less conﬁdence in their correct responses (see
review by Balzan, 2016). However although this result has been re-
plicated on a number of occasions and has been demonstrated within
the schizophrenia spectrum there are some caveats. Moritz et al. (2015)
found that these conﬁdence eﬀects may only be found when partici-
pants feel competent with a given task or subjectively ﬁnd the task easy.
The false memory and conﬁdence results from the current study cor-
respond and suggest that individuals high in delusional ideation have a
liberal response bias i.e. a general proclivity to respond old, which
suggests that they require less evidence before they are willing to call
an item old. This might reﬂect an impairment that extends beyond the
memory domain as it converges with the jumping to conclusions lit-
erature. This is usually examined using a probabilistic reasoning task,
such as the “beads task”, and it is typically found that individuals with
schizophrenia reach a decision on the basis of less evidence compared
to healthy controls (Garety & Freeman, 2013). Interestingly, the
jumping to conclusions bias has also been linked to delusions (Gawęda,
Staszkiewick, & Balzan, 2017). There are now computational models
which are attempting to unify deﬁcits across multiple domains and how
they might help to understand positive symptoms using a Bayesian
framework (e.g. Fletcher & Frith, 2009) which oﬀers much promise for
the future.
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